The aim of this talk is to critically analyze the “essential/substantial (dhātī)-descriptional/qualitative (waṣfī)” distinction in Avicennian logic, which is often claimed to exist in modern Islamic logic studies in the context of categorical propositions, and to question the possibility of obtaining a consistent essential - descriptional distinction about categorical propositions. To this end, in this talk, first, the types of necessary propositions in Ibn Sīnā (d. 428/1037) will be explained since they are largely taken as the basis for the explanations of essential - descriptional distinction in contemporary Islamic logic studies, and then two interpretations of general absolute propositions, which have critical importance in this context, will be introduced. After that, the explanations in the secondary literature on the distinction between essential and descriptional propositions will be analyzed in the center of Tony Street’s views on the subject, who has authored pioneering studies in Islamic logic. The main claim of the talk is that in Avicennian logic it is not possible to make a consistent essential-descriptional distinction that covers all categorical propositions and, as a result, the explanations of this distinction in the secondary literature are misleading.
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